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UNPAID INTERNSHIPS: FREE LABOR OR VALUABLE
LEARNING EXPERIENCE?
Robert J. Tepper* & Matthew P. Holt†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, internships have become an integral
part of the college curriculum. Many degree programs either
strongly recommend or require that students complete one or
more internships.1 Current business and accounting
accreditation standards require evidence substantiating a
curriculum where “students engage in experiential and active
learning designed to improve skills and the application of
knowledge in practice.”2 Internships, particularly those offered
in private firms, have long been thought to advance those
objectives.
This paper discusses the perceived advantages and
disadvantages of internships. It then discusses current legal

* C.P.A., M.B.A., J.D.; Principal Lecturer, Accounting Department, Anderson School of
Management, University of New Mexico.
† J.D., Assistant Professor, College of Business, Finance Department, New Mexico
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1
See Karel A. Updyke & James Sander, A Survey of AACSB Accredited
Institutions and the Use of Work Experiences as Part of the Business Curricula, Fall
2005
J.
ACAD.
BUS.
EDUC.
at
118,
120,
125,
available
at
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=cob_papers
(reporting that despite the benefits of internships, only 26 of 133 responding AACSB
schools required an internship). Recent survey data suggests that 63.2% of graduating
seniors participated in an internship or co-op program. Nat’l Ass’n of Colls. & Emp’rs,
Class of 2013: Majority of Seniors Participated in Internships or Co-ops, NACEWEB.ORG
(June
26,
2013),
https://www.naceweb.org/s06262013/internship-co-op-duringcollege.aspx. Of that number, 52.2% were paid; 47.8% were unpaid. NAT’L ASS’N OF
COLLS. & EMP’RS, THE COLLEGE CLASS OF 2013: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (Nov. 2013),
available
at
http://www.naceweb.org/uploadedFiles/Content/staticassets/downloads/executive-summary/2013-student-survey-executive-summary.pdf.
2
AACSB, 2013 Business Standards, Learning and Teaching Standards,
AACSB.EDU,
http://www.aacsb.edu/accreditation/standards/2013-business/learningand-teaching/ (last visited July 31, 2014); see also AACSB, 2013 Accounting Standards,
Learning
and
Teaching
Standards,
AACSB.EDU,
http://www.aacsb.edu/accreditation/accounting/standards/2013/learning-and-teaching/
(last visited July 31, 2014).
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challenges involving unpaid internships primarily in the
private sector.3 These challenges involve application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). The FLSA requires,
with certain exceptions, that employees engaged in interstate
commerce are paid minimum wage and time-and-a half for
workweek hours over forty, and that employers maintain
adequate records. Courts employ different standards to assess
whether an unpaid intern is an employee subject to the Act.
Most apply a fact-intensive “totality of the circumstances”
approach and conclude that if the primary beneficiary of the
arrangement is the intern, then the intern is not an employee.
However, a minority of courts requires the employer to satisfy
all elements of a six-factor test developed by the Department of
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division currently in a “Fact Sheet.”
This article argues that the Fact Sheet should be accorded
little deference because it merely interprets a Supreme Court
decision. Further, it is ambiguous as to the extent that all six
factors must be met. Additionally, unpaid internships are a
minefield of potential liability for employers for several
reasons: (1) uncertainty regarding the applicable standard for
whether the intern is subject to the Act, (2) non-waivable
character of the Act,4 (3) opt-in procedures for FLSA claims
that are fairly easy, (4) potential for fee shifting, and (5)
existence of similar state-law provisions with similar
remedies.5
3
“Internship” is a term used to describe a variety of arrangements between a
sponsor, a student, and an academic institution. Sponsors may include for-profit
employers, as well as private, not-for-profit, and governmental entities. Moreover,
internships may be paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, for academic credit or not,
and required by an academic institution or merely recommended. NAT’L ASS’N OF
COLLS. & EMP’RS, POSITION STATEMENT: UNPAID INTERNSHIPS (June 2010), available at
http://www.naceweb.org/advocacy/position-statements/unpaid-internships.aspx?landintern-lp-1-adv-ps-ui-08152014 (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
The variety of
arrangements sometimes “makes it difficult to apply common and consistent
standards, guidelines, and applicable policies.” Id. This article primarily addresses
for-profit, private sector internships (rather than the large number of public and nonprofit internships that are not part of the analysis) though our suggestions for
improving internships may well apply to all internships.
4
Though the Act is non-waivable, it has a two-year limitations period with a
three-year period for willful violations. 29 U.S.C.A. § 255(a) (West 2014); Haro v. City
of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2014). These limitation periods should
serve to limit liability.
5
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a) (West 2014) (overtime); CAL. LAB. CODE §
1182.12 (West 2014) (minimum wage); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 232 (McKinney 2014)
(overtime for certain employees); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney 2014). Of course, a
State minimum wage may exceed the federal minimum wage, thereby increasing
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More significantly, assuming that an unpaid internship
falls within a safe harbor with respect to the Act, is it ethical to
ask students to work for no pay? We conclude that it is, when
adequate safeguards are in place that ensure a meaningful
educational experience open to all who are qualified. Finally,
the paper discusses what steps both schools and employers
should take to limit liability and provide a better internship
experience for students.
II.

WHY INTERNSHIPS?

In many fields, students are encouraged to seek out internships, preferably the paid variety.6 Students, schools, and employers all have reasons for favoring internships.
A.

Student Perspectives

Internships are widely believed to expose the student to the
practical side of a discipline and provide relevant work experience. Students see internships as a way to gain much-needed
experience, improve job skills, and potentially receive an offer
of future employment with a firm or government entity, even if
not with their specific employer.7 College credit is often an additional benefit necessitating little extra work beyond the internship itself.
Even where there is not potential employment, students
expect to gain valuable contacts through networking and to
build a stronger resumé. This may take the form of professional
references or public recognition for projects, e.g., being listed in
a film’s end credits or a published work’s acknowledgements.
Students also likely improve job-hunting skills in the process of
applying and interviewing for internships. Further, obtaining a
competitive internship is often viewed as an achievement in
and of itself, distinguishing a student from his or her peers.
liability.
6
A recent survey of 2013 graduates suggests that a higher percentage of those
completing paid internships received at least one job offer (63.1%) compared to those
who completed unpaid internships (37%) or no internship at all (35.2%). Nat’l Ass’n of
Colls. & Emp’rs, Class of 2013: Paid Interns Outpace Unpaid Peers in Job Offers,
Salaries, NACEWEB.ORG (May 29, 2013), http://www.naceweb.org/s05292013/paidunpaid-interns-job-offer.aspx. The results may not be surprising given that paid
internships are increasingly becoming a “tryout” for paid positions.
7
David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student
Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 241 (1998).
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School Perspectives

From a school’s perspective, an internship program demonstrates that it is pursuing active and experiential learning for
its students. Moreover, supplying students for internships may
improve a school’s relationship with an employer and encourages the employer to look to the school as a source for future
interns and full-time employees. Outside the classroom, faculty
members often are called upon to consult with industry. An internship program can solidify a relationship between individual professors and a firm and pave the way for future consulting
opportunities. A school can also charge tuition in exchange for
college credit for internships, often with reasonable levels of
faculty involvement, making it unnecessary to deploy additional faculty to manage internships.
Concerns include placing too much emphasis on internships
where less time is spent with the actual academic content of
the degree program. Additionally, by requiring unpaid internships as a prerequisite for paid employment, employers may
essentially be imposing an unpaid training period on all students who apply. Most faculty do not want to participate in
programs that might exploit students and interns lack the protection that even a probationary employee might have.
C.

Employer Perspectives

Employers can often be motivated by altruistic reasons—
paying it forward. Taking on an intern is a way to introduce a
new entrant to an industry, or to a profession and to cultivate a
future colleague. It is a way for employers to give something
back to a school, or at least sample what the school has to offer
in terms of prospective employees. Employers may like the opportunity, or feel pressure to have an internship program, to
have first choice among highly qualified students. Students
are probably more likely to accept an offer from an employer
known through an internship than pursue the unknown.
Possibly the greatest incentive internships offer employers
is a low risk and inexpensive method of appraising suitability
for eventual hire.8 Many firms extend entry-level offers to interns who successfully complete an internship. Finally, an intern may provide help with the tasks at hand, although most
8

Id. at 241–42.
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professional employers recognize that in a meaningful internship, the investment in training the intern generally exceeds
an intern’s contribution.
Given such advantages, what can go wrong? The next section discusses common problems with internships.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH INTERNSHIPS
Student complaints include: internships rarely lead to jobs,
training is poor or non-existent, supervision is minimal, tasks
are mundane, hours are often long, and the work has little applicability to professional pursuits. Perhaps reminiscent that
“no good deed goes unpunished,” providing an internship opportunity has generated complaints that unpaid internships in
the for-profit, private sector9 are just that: unpaid, but in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). This is
because interns are alleged to be “employees” under the Act,
and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime. Employers
may take no comfort in knowing that an intern fully understands that the internship is unpaid. The protections of the Act
cannot be waived.10 There are cases where courts have held
that people who willingly worked without compensation were
9
Generally, volunteers who perform services for state or local governmental
agencies are not considered employees under the FLSA if they receive no compensation
(or merely expenses, reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee). 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(4)(A)
(West 2014); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.100, 553.106(a) (2013). The FLSA also contains an
exemption from minimum wage and maximum hour provisions for employees
“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity,” 29
U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1) (West 2014), but that exemption requires that the employee be
paid a salary, 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200(a)(1), 541.300(a)(1), 541.600 (2013). The FLSA has
a provision for employment under a special certificate which might enable an employer
to pay less than minimum wage (95%) to learners, apprentices, and messengers. 29
U.S.C.A. § 214(a) (West 2014); 29 C.F.R. §§ 520.300 (definitions), 520.400–520.412
(2013). The certificate is dependent upon prevention of curtailment of employment
opportunities, 29 U.S.C.A. § 214(a), so an employer would have to demonstrate an
effort to recruit experienced workers, 29 C.F.R. §§ 520.403(a)(1), 520.404(e) (2013). A
similar provision (at 85% of the minimum wage) exists for employment of student
learners enrolled in an accredited educational program and employed part-time
pursuant to a bona-fide vocational training program. 29 U.S.C.A. § 214(b) (West 2014);
29 C.F.R. § 530.300 (2013); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 520.500–520.508 (2013). Of course, these
provisions require compensation, which is inconsistent with an unpaid internship, and
depend upon a demonstrated need for employees (a shortage of applicants not in need
of training).
10
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); Brooklyn Sav.
Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945); Boaz v. FedEx Customer Info. Servs., Inc.,
725 F.3d 603, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2013).
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in fact employees and entitled to compensation.11 Obviously,
the potential for litigation over a claim for unpaid wages and
overtime may dampen employers’ enthusiasm to participate in
unpaid internships.
A.

Employer Responsibilities Under the Act

Under the Act, with certain exceptions, employers must pay
employees engaged in interstate commerce at least minimum
wage12 and time-and-a half for hours worked over forty in a
workweek.13 The Act has several purposes, including protection
for workers from long hours and substandard wages, protection
for employers from unfair competition from employers who
might pay their workers substandard wages, and the reduction
of unemployment by requiring overtime compensation.14 Requiring that all employees be paid ensures fair wages are paid
to others in the industry by reducing the incentive to hire those
who would work for substandard or non-monetary compensation.15
Employers are also required to keep adequate records
concerning the hours worked by their employees.16 In a
successful claim for unpaid wages, an intern is entitled to an
additional, equal amount as liquidated damages unless the
11
See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 306 (holding religious
foundation workers were entitled to compensation); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d
1207, 1208 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding uncompensated trainees were employees); Bailey v.
Pilots’ Ass’n, 406 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (concluding pilot-boat apprentice
was employee).
12
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a) (West 2014); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, ___
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013).
13
29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1) (West 2014).
14
29 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (West 2014); Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 710, n.25;
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945); Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC,
721 F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2013).
15
Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302 (“If an exception to the Act
were carved out for employees willing to testify that they performed work ‘voluntarily,’
employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make
such assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act.”); Lucas, 721 F.3d at 936–
937 (applying same rationale to undocumented aliens); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846
F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (same).
16
29 U.S.C.A. § 211(c) (West 2014); 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2(a)(7), 516.5 (2013).
Where an employer has not kept adequate records, the employee may prove the
amount of time by “just and reasonable inference.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946); Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 363–64
(2nd Cir. 2011). The burden then shifts to the employer to prove the precise amount by
negating the reasonableness of the inference; lacking that, a court may award an
approximate amount. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687–88.
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employer can demonstrate that its non-compliance was in good
faith and it had reasonable grounds to believe its conduct was
not in violation of the law.17 Where the employer has not kept
adequate records, an employee need only prove approximate
amounts.18
Under the Act, “employer” and “to employ” are defined
broadly.19 An employee is “any individual employed by an
employer.”20 “Employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.”21
“Work” incorporates “physical or mental exertion (whether
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the
employer.”22 It can be on-site or off-site and the employer has
the responsibility to ensure that any work it does not want is
not performed.23 Not surprisingly, paid interns engaged in
interstate commerce are considered employees subject to the
Act.24 The question remains as to whether interns who are not
paid are employees, and therefore entitled to the protections of
the Act.25
17
29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 260 (West 2014). The burden is on the employer to show
subjective good faith and the objective reasonableness of its conduct, and liquidated
damages are the norm in these types of cases. Reich v. S. New England Telecomms.
Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 70–71 (2d Cir. 1997). A successful claimant also is entitled to a
reasonable attorney’s fee. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2014); Black v. SettlePou, LLC,
732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013).
18
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687–88.
19
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947); Rosenwasser,
323 U.S. at 362 (“A broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be
difficult to frame.”); Lucas, 721 F.3d at 934 (noting the “sweeping definitions of
‘employer’ and ‘employee’”).
20
29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1) (West 2014).
21
29 U.S.C.A. § 203(g) (West 2014).
22
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944);
see also Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2nd Cir. 2008).
23
29 C.F.R. §§ 785.12, 785.13 (2013).
24
See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206(a) (minimum wages) & 207(a) (maximum hours)
(West 2014). Paid interns do not appear to come within any exemptions. See 29
U.S.C.A. § 213 (exemptions) (West 2014).
25
The definition of an employee under the FLSA is the same as for the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(3) (West 2014). Thus, if an
unpaid intern is an employee under the FLSA, she may be entitled to protection under
the FMLA provided she meets length of service requirements. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(A)
(West 2014). Courts look at common law employment concepts, including the right to
control the means and manner of performance, in deciding whether a volunteer is an
employee under Title VII. O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997). Most
circuits would require some kind of remuneration to consider an intern an employee
entitled to protections under various anti–discrimination statutes including Title VII,
the ADA and ADEA. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435
(5th Cir. 2013); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir.
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Tests for Determining Employee status

The Act does not define “intern” or “extern,” so the analysis
of whether an unpaid intern is an employee begins with
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., which considered unpaid
trainees.26 The Portland Terminal Co. offered a course in
practical training for prospective yard brakemen. The course
involved seven to eight days of training, during which time the
trainee was instructed and supervised by the working yard
crew. The trainees were not compensated for their time.27
The Department of Labor brought suit against Portland
Terminal, alleging that the trainees were employees under the
FLSA, and should have been paid for the time they spent
training. Portland Terminal denied that the trainees were its
employees.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the trainees were
not employees under the Act. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court made several observations:
1. The trainees did not displace any regular employees.28
2. The trainees’ work did not expedite the company’s
business, and in fact it actually impeded the company’s work.29
3. The trainees were not guaranteed a job, though they
became eligible for employment if they successfully completed
the program.30
4. The trainees were not paid, and did not expect to be paid
for the time spent training.31
1998); O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 116; Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71,
73 (8th Cir. 1990). But see Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t., Inc., 656 F.3d
348, 353–54 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering remuneration but one factor to consider in
whether an employment relationship exists); Fichman v. Media Center, 512 F.3d 1157,
1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). Other statutory schemes, however, may have different
definitions of “employee,” so that an employee for purposes of the FLSA may not be
entitled to other statutory protections. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (distinguishing the scope of “employee” under ERISA as not being
as broad as it is under the FLSA).
26
330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947). Portland Terminal had a companion case that
reached the same result. Walling v. Nashville Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 330 U.S.
158 (1947).
27
The trainees who successfully completed the course and were certified as
competent were eligible to be hired by Portland Terminal. Beginning in 1943, if the
trainees were hired, Portland Terminal then gave them a retroactive allowance of
$4.00 per day for their training period. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 150.
28
Id. at 149–50.
29
Id. at 150.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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The Court analogized the situation to a public or private
vocational school:
Had these trainees taken courses in railroading in a public or
private vocational school, wholly disassociated from the
railroad, it could not reasonably be suggested that they were
employees of the school within the meaning of the Act. Nor
could they, in that situation, have been considered as
employees of the railroad merely because the school’s
graduates would constitute a labor pool from which the
railroad could later draw its employees. The Fair Labor
Standards Act was not intended to penalize railroads for
providing, free of charge, the same kind of instruction at a
place and in a manner which would most greatly benefit the
trainees.32

The Court closed by noting that the railroad received no
“immediate advantage” from the work done by the trainees,
and then held that the trainees were not employees.33
1. Regulatory interpretation of Portland Terminal – Fact Sheet
#71
In 2010, the Department of Labor issued Fact Sheet #71, to
provide “general information to help determine whether
interns must be paid the minimum wage and overtime under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.”34 The substance of Fact Sheet
has appeared in response to inquiries about interns and a 1980
Wage and Hour publication concerning the employment
relationship.35 Although claiming only to provide “general
information,” the current Fact Sheet sets the tone early when it
articulates an assumption that interns are employees:
Internships in the “for-profit” private sector will most often be
viewed as employment, unless the test described below
relating to trainees is met. Interns in the “for-profit” private
Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 153.
34
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE
FAIR
LABOR
STANDARDS
ACT
1
(April
2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
35
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2004 WL 5303033, at *2 (May 17, 2004) (“The
Department of Labor has consistently applied this test in response to questions about
the employment status of student interns.”); WH Pub. 1297, at 4–5 (Rev. 1980,
Reprinted
Aug.
1985),
available
at
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Inside_Bar/Labor/Employment%20Relationship.pdf.
32
33
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sector who qualify as employees rather than trainees must be
paid at least the minimum wage and overtime compensation
for hours worked over forty in a workweek.

The Fact Sheet itself claims that the Supreme Court held
that the phrase “suffer or permit to work” cannot be
interpreted “so as to make a person whose work serves only his
or her own interest an employee of another who provides aid or
instruction.” This appears to be a reference to Portland
Terminal, which did in fact hold that a person who serves only
his own interest is not the employee of a business that provides
aid or instruction. Note, however, that Portland Terminal
never held that someone who serves his own interest—and
benefits another in the process—becomes an employee of the
person benefitted.
The “guidance” from Fact Sheet #71 is embodied in six
criteria that it sets forth.36 The Department of Labor gives
conflicting instructions on the import of the criteria. Before
listing the criteria, the Fact Sheet acknowledges that the
determination of whether an intern is an employee “depends on
all the facts and circumstances,” suggesting a “totality of the
circumstances” type of analysis. After listing the criteria,
however, the Fact Sheet suggests that the criteria provide a
bright line test: “if all of the factors” are met, the intern is not
an employee under the FLSA. In addition to insisting upon
application of all the factors, the Fact Sheet explains that the
exclusion is “quite narrow” implying that the failure to meet
one is determinative.
The Fact Sheet’s factors parallel, but do not exactly mimic,
points raised by the Court in Portland Terminal, as
illuminated in the following table.

Fact Sheet #71
1. The internship, even
though it includes actual
operation of the facilities of
the employer, is similar to
training which would be
given in an educational
environment;

Portland Terminal
1. Had a vocational school
offered the same training,
the school would not be
deemed
the
students’
employer.

36
The six criteria have been used by the Department of Labor since 1967, Reich
v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993), although “intern”
has sometimes been substituted for “trainee” and “internship” for “training period.”
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2.
The
internship 2. The training would most
experience is for the benefit greatly
benefit
the
of the intern;
trainees.37
3. The intern does not 3. The trainees did not
displace regular employees, displace
any
regular
but works under close employees.
supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that 4. The railroad received no
provides
the
training immediate advantage by
derives
no
immediate providing the training.
advantage
from
the
activities of the intern; and
on occasion its operations
may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not 5. The trainees were not
necessarily entitled to a job guaranteed a job, though
at the conclusion of the they were eligible for
internship; and
employment
if
they
successfully completed the
training.
6. The employer and the 6. The trainees were not,
intern understand that the and did not expect to be,
intern is not entitled to paid for the time spent
wages for the time spent in training.
the internship.
It is not surprising that most courts reject a literal
application of the Fact Sheet’s criteria and instead adopt a
“totality of the circumstances” or an “economic realities” test.
Perhaps more importantly, courts appear to have uniformly

37
New employees are not always entitled to be compensated for training time,
particularly where the training is a pre-condition of employment and does not involve
productive work. 29 C.F.R. § 785.27 (2013); Chao v. Tradesmen Int’l., Inc., 310 F.3d
904, 910 (6th Cir. 2002); Ballou v. Gen. Elec. Co., 433 F.2d 109, 111–12 (1st Cir. 1970).
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rejected the suggestion that an intern must be working “solely”
for his own benefit or will otherwise be deemed an employee.
Instead, courts focus on who is the “primary beneficiary” of the
relationship.
2. Totality of the circumstances
The totality of the circumstances approach seems to be
mandated by the Supreme Court itself. Just a few months after
the decision in Portland Terminal, the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,38 which also
dealt with the question of what constituted an “employee”
under the Act. More specifically, the issue was whether the
worker was an employee or whether he was an independent
contractor, a frequent issue under the Act. The Court reviewed
the traditional tests for differentiating between employees and
independent contractors, and then noted:
We think, however, that the determination of the relationship
does not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the
circumstances of the whole activity.39

A number of cases have cited to Rutherford in support of
the proposition that the totality of the circumstances should be
used to determine whether someone is an employee. For
example, in Mendel v. Gibraltar40 the issue was whether
firefighters were employees under the Act. The firefighters
were referred to as volunteers. They could decide what calls to
respond to, but received an hourly “stipend” when they were on
call. Quoting from Rutherford, the court stated that the
“circumstances of the whole activity” had to be evaluated and
that the determination of whether the firefighters were
employees hinged on the economic realities of the situation.41
Because the hourly “stipend” paid the firefighters
approximated typical wages paid to professional firefighters,
the court determined that they were, in fact, employees.
In a similar case, the Tenth Circuit was called on to
determine whether firefighters were entitled to compensation
for the time they spent in firefighter academy.42 Specifically
38
39
40
41
42

331 U.S. 722 (1947).
Id. at 730.
727 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 569–70.
Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
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rejecting a rigid application of the criteria contained in the Fact
Sheet, the court found that the process of distinguishing
between an employee and an independent contractor (as was at
issue in Rutherford) was analogous, and agreed that no one
factor was dispositive, but instead a decision should be based
on the economic realities after looking at the total situation.43
Looking to the “economic realities,” the court concluded that
the potential firefighters attending the academy were not
employees.
The Supreme Court has made clear that no single factor is
controlling, instead the economic realities of the situation have
to be understood. The Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation had
a number of unpaid “associates” working for it in a variety of
capacities.44 The Department of Labor brought suit, claiming
that the associates were employees. The Foundation, however,
argued that it was a charitable and religious organization that
was helping the less fortunate with behavioral problems by
providing them with a place to work. The associates themselves
testified that they were volunteers and not employees. The
Court said that the test of employment was one of “economic
reality”45 and analyzed all of the circumstances before
concluding that the associates were employees, largely because
the work that they were doing directly supported a commercial
enterprise that was in direct competition with businesses that
paid their workers.46
3. Deference to the Fact Sheet
Some courts have afforded the Fact Sheet substantial
deference,47 while a small minority of courts completely reject
the Fact Sheet.48 Other courts have decided that it is entitled to

43
44
45

992 F.2d at 1026–27.
Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 301; accord Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33

(1961).
46
The Department of Labor took a similar position in response to charity
bagging as a fundraiser: students carried shoppers’ groceries to their cars for donations
only. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2002 WL 32406599, at *2–3 (Oct. 7, 2002).
47
See Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1983).
48
See, for example, Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, which noted
that the Fact Sheet was “a poor method for determining employee status in a training
or education setting. For starters, it is overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-ofthe-circumstances approach, where no one factor (or the absence of one factor)
controls.” 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011).
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some deference.49 However, of those that have given the Fact
Sheet deference, only a few have explained the reasoning for
such deference.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
the deference. The Court has found that a reviewing court must
give deference to the rules, actions, and decisions by
administrative agencies in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.50 and
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,51 which set forth two distinct standards that are generally
referred to as Skidmore deference and Chevron deference.52
Skidmore deference and Chevron deference are markedly
different in several important regards. Chevron deference
requires courts to give controlling deference to an agency
interpretation of a statute if the statute is ambiguous and the
agency’s interpretation reasonably resolves the ambiguity.53
Chevron deference, however, is applicable only if (a) Congress
intended to confer authority on the agency to issue
interpretations having the force of law and (b) the
interpretation in question was issued according to the format
Congress contemplated would be eligible for Chevron
deference.54
If an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not entitled to
deference under Chevron, then the interpretation must be
analyzed under Skidmore. Under Skidmore, a court can
consider, but is not bound by, the agency’s interpretation. In
deciding whether to apply Chevron deference or Skidmore
deference, the first step is typically to determine whether
49
See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir.
1993) (giving Skidmore deference); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th
Cir. 1989) (giving Chevron deference); Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, 504 F.
App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Referring to the Fact Sheet, the court in
Kaplan noted that the “rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under [the FLSA], while not controlling upon courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance.” Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834–35 (quoting Dade
County v. Alvarez, 1234 F.3d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir. 1997)).
50
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
51
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52
A third type of deference, Auer deference, has no application in this matter.
In Auer v. Robbins, the Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulation should be deferred to by the courts as long as that interpretation
was not clearly erroneous. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). The Fact Sheet, however, is not a
regulation, and is not subject to Auer deference.
53
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
54
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
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Congress intended to confer on the agency the authority to
issue interpretations that have the force of law. In this case,
determining whether Congress intended for the Department of
Labor to issue interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
that would have the force of law is critical. Fortunately, the
Supreme Court seems to have already answered this question,
as Skidmore itself involved an interpretive bulletin adopted by
the Department of Labor to implement the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
In Skidmore, seven employees of Swift & Co. filed suit,
seeking to recover compensation for time they spent waiting for
work. The trial court found that the waiting time was not
compensable. Apparently the trial court felt “restricted by its
notion that waiting time may not be work.” This conclusion was
based solely on the position the administrator of the
Department of Labor took in a bulletin it had issued.55 The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting that it was up
to the courts, and not to the Department of Labor, to
authoritatively interpret the law.
Seguing from deciding whether the courts must defer to the
Department of Labor’s interpretive bulletin56 to evaluating
whether the interpretive bulletin should be instructive, the
Court clearly agreed that the administrative agency’s
interpretation was entitled only to some deference. The weight
of the deference should depend
[U]pon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.57

Given that Skidmore involved the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and that the Supreme Court ruled that the courts could be
guided by, but were not bound by, the interpretive bulletins
adopted by the Department of Labor, it seems settled that
Skidmore deference, and not Chevron deference, should apply
to the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. In fact, some courts giving deference to the Fact
Sheet have cited to Skidmore as the reason for giving it
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
The Court, of course, did not refer to such deference as Chevron deference, as
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., would not be decided
for another 40 years.
57
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
55
56
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deference.58
Skidmore, however, seems to concern itself with situations
in which an administrative agency is interpreting a statute (or
even regulations).59 In contrast, the Fact Sheet does not seem
to interpret the statute so much as it interprets the Supreme
Court’s decision in Portland Terminal.60 There is nothing to
suggest that the Department of Labor is in a better position to
interpret case law than a judge, and therefore little, if any,
deference should be given to the Fact Sheet.
An analogous issue, raised in Melvin v. Astrue was whether
and how much deference should be given to an Acquiescence
Ruling that had been made by the Social Security
Administration.61 An Acquiescence Ruling (“AR”) is a ruling
that the Social Security Administration issues that interprets a
holding of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals concerning
the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration
argued that an AR was ignored and claimed that the AR was
entitled to deference under Skidmore. The district court
disagreed:
Further, Skidmore deference is tempered where the
administrative official lacks expertise in the area.
See
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269. Plaintiff fails to explain why the
Commissioner is better able to interpret a federal appellate
decision than a United States District Court. No rational
explanation appears to exist. Accordingly, the court rejects
plaintiff’s argument that Skidmore deference applies to ARs.62

Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that the Wage and Hour
58
Some courts have given deference to the Department of Labor’s factors based
upon Chevron deference, which provides that, where Congress intended for the agency
to complete a legislative scheme, the agency’s interpretation will be upheld unless
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843–44. Perhaps these cases consider the Fact Sheet as interpretative of FLSA, in
addition to Portland Terminal. See McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th
Cir. 1989); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(Sotomayor, J.). Generally, Chevron deference is afforded regulations where there has
been notice and comment and adjudications; the Tenth Circuit has held that the factors
are entitled to Skidmore, but not Chevron deference. Reich v. Parker Fire Protection
Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993).
59
See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008).
60
Of course, the argument can be made that the Fact Sheet is really
interpreting the terms “employer,” “employee,” and “employ” as used in the FLSA. 29
U.S.C.A. § 203(d), (e)(1), (g) (West 2014).
61
602 F. Supp. 2d 694, 702–03 (E.D.N.C. 2009).
62
Id. at 703; accord Carter v. Astrue, Civ. A. CBD-11-2980, 2013 WL 4461579,
at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2013).
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Division of the Department of Labor is better able to interpret
a decision from the United States Supreme Court than another
court.
Moreover, the Department of Labor has taken positions
inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the Fact Sheet.
Although the Fact Sheet claims that if all six factors are met
the intern or trainee is not an employee, the prefatory
comments in the Fact Sheet expressly say a determination of
whether participants in a particular program would be
employees “depends upon all of the facts and circumstances.” A
“facts and circumstances” analysis negates the idea of a brightline rule.63 A bright-line rule is also inconsistent with a position
previously taken by the Department of Labor. In an opinion it
issued in 1967, the administrator clearly set forth a totality of
the circumstances approach:
The Court has made it clear that there is no single rule or test
for determining whether an individual is an employee, but
that the total situation controls. The Court has indicated a
number of factors which help to determine whether an
employment relationship exists.64

Notwithstanding the language of the Fact Sheet, at oral
argument in a case involving the question whether trainees
were employees, the Department of Labor agreed that the court
was not bound to an all-or-nothing standard.65
Given the fact that the Department of Labor’s Fact Sheet
really does not interpret the statute, and given the fact that the
Department of Labor has taken inconsistent positions on this
very issue, the Fact Sheet is entitled to little deference. An “all
or nothing” approach may have the virtue of simplicity, i.e., not
meeting any one factor means the intern is an employee.66 In
63
See Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid Law-Student Workers,
38 VT. L. REV. 555, 591 (2014).
64
Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Op. Wage–Hour Adm’r No. 638 (July 18, 1967)).
65
Id. at 1026–27. Despite this, the position of the Department of Labor since
promulgation of the Fact Sheet seems to advance an “all-or-nothing” approach, i.e., if
any of the six factors are not met, the intern will be deemed an employee. See, e.g., U.S.
Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2004 WL 2146931, at *2 (May 17, 2004) (“[P]rovided the six
criteria listed below are met . . . the students will not be considered employees.”); U.S.
Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1994 WL 1004761, at *2 (Mar. 25, 1994) (concluding interns
were employees under FLSA because “criterion number 4 discussed above would not be
met”).
66
David C. Yamada, The Employment Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 215, 233 (2002). But even with an “all or nothing” approach, the Department of
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contrast, a “totality of the circumstances” or “economic reality”
test calls for more factual development and nuanced ad-hoc
balancing.67 The latter approach, however, is consistent with
Supreme Court law. If there is a dispute, the parties should be
able to stipulate to the basic facts of any internship
arrangement. If they do not, trial courts are adept at factual
findings. Given those findings, courts are capable of applying
the law. Though the “economic reality” test may involve ad-hoc
balancing, most judges are generalists and engage in ad-hoc
balancing on a regular basis.
4. Immediate benefit v. primary benefit
Many of the cases involving trainees and interns may turn
on a question that some may call semantic, whether “benefit of
the intern/trainee” means “sole benefit”. According to the Fact
Sheet, the trainee/intern is an employee unless the internship
experience is for the benefit of the intern, which certainly
implies that it must be for the sole benefit of the intern. Thus,
the Department of Labor concluded that an employer offering a
youth hostel internship must comply with the minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the FLSA; the employer would
derive an immediate advantage from the activities of the intern
in operating the hostel.68 On the other hand, a one-week
internship program where students shadowed employees did
not benefit the employer, and indeed may have reduced
productivity.69 Informal opinions for the Department of Labor
suggest that an important determinant of benefit is “whether
Labor often forgoes providing an answer for want of adequate factual development
regarding the factors. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2004 WL 2146931, at *2 (May
17, 2004); U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2002 WL 32406598, at *2–3 (Sept. 5, 2002);
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032496, at *2 (July 11, 1995); U.S. Dep’t of
Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032473, at *1 (Mar. 13, 1995). Of course, there are cases
where the facts so clearly indicate the “intern” is an employee, the matter can be
decided as a matter of law regardless of the test. See Pfunk v. Cohere Commc’ns, LLC,
2014 WL 2208012, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2014) (applying FLSA test to Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) claim and holding
that a compensated employee was not an intern under the totality of the circumstances
or the six-factor test).
67
Yamada, supra note 66, at 233 (contending that a “totality of the
circumstances” approach requires subjective judgment and analysis by the trier of fact
and will result in inconsistent results).
68
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1994 WL 1004761, at *1–2 (Mar. 25, 1994); see
also U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032497, at *1 (July 17, 1995) (noting
that if all of the factors are met the students are not considered employees).
69
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 2006 WL 1094598, at *4 (Apr. 6, 2006).
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the productive work performed by the interns would be offset
by the burden to the employer from the training and
supervision provided.”70
However, courts have found that even if the entity
providing the opportunity obtains some benefit, that does not
necessarily mean that persons availing themselves of the
opportunity are employees.71
For example, in Portland
Terminal the railroad was benefitted to the extent that by
training brakemen it created a qualified pool of potential
employees.
Rather than looking to whether the alleged
employer obtained any benefit, the courts that more narrowly
view the issue to instead ask whether the “employer” obtained
any “immediate benefit.”72
The Court clearly relied on the fact that the railroad did not
receive any immediate benefit in coming to the conclusion that
the trainees were not employees: “Accepting the unchallenged
findings here that the railroads receive no ‘immediate
advantage’ from any work done by the trainees, we hold that
they are not employees within the Act’s meaning.”73 Some
courts have looked to this language finding that the question of
immediate benefit becomes dispositive. For example, Donovan
v. American Airlines relied upon what it saw as “the simple and
direct language of Justice Black’s opinion in Portland
Terminal” to question (1) whether the trainee displaces other
workers, and, (2) whether the company derives any immediate
benefit from the trainee’s labor.74
In contrast, other courts do not resolve the issue on the
“immediate benefit” analysis, and have instead looked to see
who is the “primary beneficiary” of the relationship.75 If it is
the trainee, the balance tips in favor of finding that he is not an
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032473, at *1 (Mar. 13, 1995).
See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982).
72
See, e.g., Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983);
Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787–88 (4th Cir. 1964).
73
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947).
74
Donovan, 686 F.2d at 271–72. The court also affirmed the district court’s
finding that the trainees benefitted more than the company. Id. at 272.
75
See, e.g., Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding chores
required of boarding school student primarily benefitted the student); McLaughlin v.
Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he general test used to determine if an
employee is entitled to the protections of the Act is whether the employee or the
employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees’ labor.”); Archie v. Grand Cent.
P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding work by homeless persons in a
training program benefitted employer more than the plaintiffs).
70
71
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employee. If it is the “employer,” the balance tips in favor of
finding an employment relationship. For example, in Solis v.
Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the primary beneficiary analysis is the proper
framework under Portland Terminal:
We find that a primary benefit test provides a helpful
framework for discerning employee status in learning or
training situations. By focusing on the benefits flowing to
each party, the test readily captures the distinction the FLSA
attempts to make between trainees and employees. See
Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152 (stating that FLSA is not
intended to reach persons “who, without any express or
implied compensation agreement, might work for their own
advantage on the premises of another.”).76

Solis, of course, does not directly deal with the language used
by the Court in Portland Terminal, which other courts have
relied upon in adopting the “immediate benefit” analysis.
Perhaps the only court to recognize and directly address the
issue was a district court in the Southern District of New York.
In Wang v. Hearst Corp.,77 the court pointed out that the
dispute between “immediate benefit” and “primary beneficiary”
analysis was rooted in the language used by the Court in
Portland Terminal:
Although the Supreme Court held in Walling that the men in
that case were not employees because the defendant railroads
received “no immediate advantage” from the trainees, 330
U.S. at 153, it does not logically follow that the reverse is
true, i.e. that the presence of an “immediate advantage” alone
creates an employment relationship under the FLSA.
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reading of Walling as establishing the
test for an employer-employee relationship solely based on
“direct or immediate benefit” is misplaced. There is no onedimensional test; rather, the prevailing view is the totality of
circumstances test.78

The court’s simple yet sound conclusion is compelling.
Complete reliance on the immediate benefit test is simply
inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances test. And
because the “economic reality” or totality of the circumstances

76
77
78

Solis, 642 F.3d at 529.
Wang v. Hearst Corp, 293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 493.
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test has been clearly embraced by the Supreme Court itself,79
the only explanation for the “immediate advantage” language
used in Portland Terminal is that it was relevant to that case
(there was no immediate advantage to the railroad). The Court
simply was not saying that someone receiving training would
be an employee if the company providing the training receives
some immediate benefit.
C.

Recent Cases in the Context of Post-Secondary Education

In Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether unpaid externs who were required
to complete an externship as part of their medical coding and
billing studies were actually employees.80 The plaintiffs argued
that the work was repetitive, they received little educational
benefit, and that they conferred an economic benefit upon the
employer.81 The court applied the factors in the Fact Sheet and
concluded that the students: (a) received similar training to
that offered by a school, (b) satisfied a requirement of
graduation, thereby benefitting personally, (c) were supervised
closely and did not displace other workers.82 The court further
held that the employer did not receive an immediate
advantage; indeed, its operations were impeded by the
training.83 Accordingly, a grant of summary judgment in favor
of the employer was upheld.84 The court was not required to
decide if some advantage to the employer would have been
sufficient to invoke the Act.85
Two recent district court cases in the Southern District of

79
See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301
(1985). Indeed, even before Portland Terminal was decided, the Supreme Court
recognized that something might be done both for the benefit of a worker and for a
company, and held that it was compensable if it was primarily for the benefit of the
employer. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 599, 603 (1944).
80
504 F. App’x at 832–33.
81
Id. at 833.
82
Id. at 835.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Cooperative education programs (with arrangements like that in Kaplan)
would seem to be the paradigmatic case for not considering students employees. Thus,
fire protection technology students enrolled in a community college, who received part
of their training and experience in a fire protection district, were not considered
employees after application of the six-factor test. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1986
WL 1171130, at *1–2 (Mar. 27, 1986).
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New York considered whether college student interns are
within the coverage of the Act. One case, Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures Inc., concluded that the interns were
really employees entitled to the protections of the Act.86 The
other case, Wang v. Hearst Corp. discussed above, determined
that a trial would be necessary using a “totality of the
circumstances” test.87 Both district courts certified the issue of
the proper test to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,88 which
granted leave to consider both cases in a consolidated appeal.89
In Glatt, the district court rejected application of the
“primary beneficiary” test.90 Instead, the court concluded that
the trainee exception should be interpreted narrowly and the
six factors in the Fact Sheet were entitled to deference as a
reasonable interpretation by the agency charged with enforcing
the statute.91
In pertinent part, the work involved internships in the
accounting and production departments on the film Black
Swan. The lead plaintiff worked in the accounting department
for three months, later moving to the production department.
Services that were performed while working with the
accounting
department
included
obtaining
personnel
documents, picking up paychecks, tracking and reconciling
purchase orders and invoices, and obtaining signatures.92
Production department work by the lead plaintiff and another
intern included drafting cover letters, organizing file cabinets,
running errands, assembling furniture, making travel
arrangements, taking lunch orders, removing trash, answering
phones, and making deliveries.93
Analyzing the factors suggested in the Fact Sheet, the court
evaluated whether the benefits were to the intern resulting in
academic or vocational training; building a résumé, gaining
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Wang v. The Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
88
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 1:11-cv-06784-WHP, 2013 WL
5405696 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013); Wang v. Hearst Corp., 2013 WL 3326650, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013).
89
Wang, No. 13-2616 (2d Cir. Nov. 27, 2013); Glatt, No. 13-2467 (2d Cir. Nov.
27, 2013). As of this writing, briefing and argument have yet to occur in these appeals.
90
Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 531–32. Under the primary beneficiary test, the intern
would not be considered an employee if the benefits to the intern outweighed those to
the company.
91
Id. at 532.
92
Id. at 533.
93
Id.
86
87
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references, versus the incidental benefits of learning the
operation of an office.94 The court concluded that the internship
was for the benefit of the employer, where the internship did
not impede its operations, and resulted in an immediate
advantage to the employer.95 Had the interns not performed
these tasks, the employer would have had to hire others; thus
the interns displaced other workers.96 The court highlighted the
complete lack of training comparable to what one would receive
in an academic or vocational program, as well as the
comparable work received by employees and interns.97
In contrast to Glatt, the district court in Wang v. Hearst
Corp. used the “totality of the circumstances” test—including
which party is the primary recipient of benefits—to determine
whether an unpaid intern was an employee.98 As previously
discussed, the court carefully explained why the presence of an
immediate advantage to the employer does not automatically
create an employment relationship.99 The court reasoned that
the six factors in the Fact Sheet provided a framework for
analysis based on Skidmore deference, but were not
conclusive.100 The court rejected “a winner-take-all test,” and
because the employer had shown “some educational training,
some benefit to individual interns, some supervision, and some
impediment to [its] regular operations,” the court found that
summary judgment was improper and that a jury should
resolve the issue.101
Unpaid internships are common in media industries and a
national media company may have hundreds of interns
Id. at 534.
Id.
96
Id. at 533.
97
Id. at 534.
98
Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493
99
Id.
100
Id. at 493–94.
101
Id. at 494. To the extent a totality of the circumstances test applies and the
six-factor test in the Fact Sheet is pertinent, summary judgment for either the
employer or the intern may be difficult to obtain. For example, in Griffiths v. Parker,
the plaintiff performed clerical duties for a lawyer for several months and thereafter
claimed she was an employee. 2014 WL 2095205, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2014). The
lawyer contended that she was an unpaid intern seeking to become a paralegal, though
she was not enrolled in any formal course of study. Id. The court determined that a
trial was necessary to determine whether the training benefitted the trainee or the
employer, whether the trainee displaced an employee given the office staffing history,
and whether the parties contemplated whether the trainee would be uncompensated.
Id. at *5–6.
94
95
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working in a variety of departments. Under the FLSA, these
cases may proceed as a collective action given a showing of a
common unlawful policy, which should not be difficult to make
given a national employer with an internship program.102 Of
course, the certification procedure could multiply liability by
allowing all interns subject to the allegedly unlawful policy to
opt in.103
In addition to federal and state unpaid wage claims, these
cases also may involve claims of employment discrimination
which may affect how the case is perceived by a jury (potential
employer exploitation) and settlement value. By way of
example, Alladin v. Paramount Management, LLC, involves an
unpaid intern who performed secretarial tasks for two weeks
and thereafter was paid $300 per week regardless of hours
worked.104 She brought federal claims for unpaid wages and
overtime as well as race discrimination.105 Although the
defendant admitted that the intern was an “employee,” the
district court clarified why the two-week internship was
employment.106 The court considered the nature of the tasks
performed, such as “sending packages, answering phones,
making coffee, running errands, and performing other
administrative tasks,” the absence of any training or benefit
beyond that provided to employees, the immediate advantage
to the employer, and the fact that the employer received the
primary benefit.107
Though the wages at stake may be relatively small, it is

102
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2014). Thus, conditional certification to
proceed as a FLSA action was granted in Glatt and Wang. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 538–39;
Wang, 2012 WL 2864524, at *1–3; see also Grant v. Warner Music Group, 2014 WL
1918602, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014) (granting motion for court-authorized notice).
In Grant, the plaintiffs claim that they and 3,000 other unpaid interns should have
been paid given that they performed work similar to paid employees, received little or
no supervision, and received neither academic credit nor compensation for at least part
of the time. Id. at *2, *4–5. On the other hand, in Fraticelli v. MSG Holdings, L.P., the
court determined that the action could not proceed as a collective action given that the
interns worked in about 100 different departments with varying experiences. 2014 WL
1807105, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014).
103
In O’Jeda v. Viacom, Inc., the district court left open the possibility that after
discovery the defendant could seek to de-certify and dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs if not
similarly situated. 2014 WL 1344604, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 2014).
104
Alladin v. Paramount Management, LLC, 2013 WL 4526002, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 27, 2013).
105
Race-discrimination is actionable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2014).
106
Alladin, 2013 WL 4526002, at *3.
107
Id.
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likely to be less expensive to settle a case than to litigate it.
Thus, in Bickerton v. Rose, a class action claiming PBS host
Charlie Rose and his production company utilized unpaid
interns in violation of federal and state law, defendants
reportedly settled for an estimated $110,000, with interns
receiving $110 per week for up to ten weeks and the rest going
to attorneys’ fees.108 Given the potential for collective action, an
employer may want to consider an early offer of judgment (with
attorney’s fees and costs) to an FLSA plaintiff.109 As a
preventive measure, an employer may want to add an
arbitration provision to the internship agreement so as to
minimize downside risk of a collective action and the expense of
litigation.110
IV. ARE UNPAID INTERNSHIPS ETHICAL?
As noted, an internship can offer an excellent opportunity
to gain exposure to a profession and work with outstanding
individuals. It is a popular option among students. At the
same time, there are obvious concerns about exploitation and
access. Concerning the former, in the absence of monetary
compensation, an intern should receive useful training that
will supplement formal education. For example, many students
receive college credit for internships, paid or unpaid.

108
Bickerton v. Rose, No. 650780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar. 14, 2012); Amanda
Becker, Charlie Rose Settles with Unpaid Interns as Lawsuits Spread, REUTERS (July
1, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/entertainment-us-interns-lawsuitcharlie-idUSBRE9601E820130701.
109
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. In Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 1528–29, the Court
did not decide whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies a
plaintiff’s FLSA claims can moot the individual claim when collective action allegations
remain. It did hold that if the individual FLSA claim is moot and no other plaintiffs
have opted in, the action is moot notwithstanding collective action allegations. Id. at
1529. In those circumstances, a FLSA plaintiff has no personal interest in representing
others. Id.
110
There is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Am.
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–09 (2013). Courts are expected to
enforce arbitration agreements consistent with their terms. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). Statutory claims are subject to arbitration absent a
contrary legislative directive. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669
(2012). Courts have repeatedly held that an enforceable arbitration agreement may
cover both individual and collective FLSA claims. See Walthour v. Chipio Windshield
Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1334–37 (11th Cir. 2014); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 295–99 (2d Cir. 2013); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc.,
362 F.3d 294, 297–300 (5th Cir. 2004); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319–
20 (9th Cir. 1996); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002).
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However, there is still a fairness aspect. Asking someone to
do all of the work of a paid employee (but without the pay) for
any significant length of time takes undue advantage of the
disparity in bargaining power between the internship holder
and seeker. This proves too much, no matter how beneficial
the training or career opportunities.111
To provide equal access to internship opportunities, unpaid
internships should be announced broadly Further, schools
should verify that employers have and abide by clear antidiscrimination policies that govern their selection process and
supervision of interns, particularly where applicability of antidiscrimination statutes is an open question given lack of
remuneration.
Many students simply may not be able to afford to complete
an unpaid internship or pay for extra college credits. However,
this concern accompanies many extracurricular activities
(study abroad comes to mind) and does not seem a valid reason
to discourage unpaid internships.112
V.

BETTER INTERNSHIPS AND AVOIDING EMPLOYER LIABILITY

Based upon the cases and the six factors in the Fact Sheet,
employers are well advised to consider whether an
arrangement constitutes an employment relationship and to
maintain adequate record keeping to verify their good faith
efforts. Because the protections of the Act cannot be waived, an
employer should consider the potential exposure from a claim if
the internship was in fact subject to the Act.
If an employer has many unpaid internship positions, the
possibility of a collective action and subsequent liability for
attorney’s fees magnifies this concern. While the primary
benefit test seems more consistent with “economic reality” and
would encompass the considerable intangible benefits often

111
This seems particularly true when the internship is subsequent to
graduation. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1988 WL 1534561, at *1–2 (Jan. 28,
1988) (noting that an after-graduation internship would not meet the six-factor test);
see also Paul Campos, A Judge Searches for Free Labor, SALON (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/11/21/a_judge_searches_for_free_labor/ (criticizing offer of
one-year, post-graduate gratuitous service appointment).
112
Cf. Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir.
1993) (“Nor is it dispositive that the trainees made financial sacrifices in order to
attend the academy. A vocational or associate degree program in fire science would
have entailed similar burdens.”)
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gained from an internship,113 the six factors contained in the
Fact Sheet are still important, particularly if a court insists on
full compliance with each factor.
Given the uncertainty, an employer should also document
the decision-making process to establish its good faith effort to
comply with the law as understood. This includes cataloguing
the transferable skills the intern should learn114 and
supporting evidence that placing an intern in the organization
is not a means to reduce hours of existing staff or avoid hiring
additional employees. The training program must be more than
the work itself, particularly where the provider will obtain an
economic advantage. Merely imparting basic job skills, such as
attendance, sustained effort, and the like will not be enough no
matter how laudable the program.115
Moreover, merely performing “entry level” routine tasks
will not suffice.116 Special precaution should be taken when the
provider and the intern have a social relationship apart from
the internship.117

113
The primary benefit test better recognizes that relationships often involve
mutual benefits and rarely are internships completely one-sided. It also promotes
internships; a test that is too complex and difficult to satisfy will discourage most
employers who might otherwise be willing to explore an unpaid internship.
114
The Department of Labor has indicated:

Where educational or training programs are designed to provide students with
professional experience in the furtherance of their education and the training is
academically oriented for the benefit of the students, it is our position that the
students will not be considered employees of the institution to which they are
assigned, provided the six criteria referred to above are met. For example, where
certain work activities are performed by students that are but an extension of
their academic programs, we would not assert that an employer-employee
relationship exists for the purposes of the FLSA. In situations where students
receive college credits applicable toward graduation when they volunteer to
perform internships under a college program, and the program involves the
students in real life situations and provides the students with educational
experiences unobtainable in a classroom setting, we do not believe that an
employment relationship exists between the students and the facility providing
the instruction. Where there is no employment relationship under the FLSA, the
minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the FLSA have no application . . . .
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Op. Letter, 1996 WL 1031777, at *1–2 (May 8, 1996); U.S. Dep’t of
Labor Op. Letter, 1995 WL 1032496, at *1–2 (July 11, 1995). Indicating what work
activities fulfill the academic objectives and what experiences are not available in a
classroom would seem paramount.
115
116

See Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
See Okoro v. Pyramid 4 Aegis, 2012 WL 1410025, at *10 (E.D. Wis. April 23,

2012).
117
See id. (finding a personal relationship with the employer is no bar to holding
that the plaintiff was an employee); Griffiths v. Parker, 2014 WL 2095205, at *1, *5
(May 20, 2014) (same; defendant claimed that he accommodated plaintiff’s boyfriend in
allowing her to help out in defendant’s office).
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The design of an unpaid internship should make it clear
that there is a benefit to the student through learning
transferable skills, not just general office procedure. This can
be accomplished through an academic component for college
credit. The internship could be structured around a college
course (perhaps dealing with internships) rather than the
workplace. Ideally, the internship incorporates course
objectives, measurable outcomes, and student deliverables. The
learning component may be demonstrated by staff supervision
of the intern and meaningful work.118
Merely learning about the business is not enough.119
Execution is also important. For example, in Marshall v.
Baptist Hospital, Inc., the court affirmed a finding that a
hospital was the primary beneficiary of a student clinical
arrangement in no small part due to a deficient training
program that shortchanged the students.120 Given the
requirement of an educational component, care must be taken
in internships of limited duration, for example, four weeks as
opposed to six months, to work closely with the coordinating
academic institution.
Useful unpaid internships require a commitment upon the
part of the employer to supervise and work with the interns,
thereby impeding the operations of the employer. It requires a
time commitment, i.e., the intern “shadowing” a staff member.
However, the suggestion that interns cannot work
independently on the same projects as the paid staff
overreaches.121 After all, the essential subject matter of the
internship is exposure to work customarily done in the
profession.
Once the structure of the internship is determined, the
employer should commit to a fixed duration. It would also be
useful to document that the student’s decision to accept an
unpaid internship was voluntary and consensual.122 In
addition, it is important to clarify that the internship includes
See Griffiths, 2014 WL 2095205, at *3–4
See Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding employees
were subject to the Act even though employer claimed they were learning the
business).
120
668 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1981).
121
See Yamada, supra note 66, at 233 (noting that the six-factor test “draws an
unrealistic line between ‘training’ and ‘work’”).
122
Though waiver of FLSA protection is not a complete defense to possible
liability.
118
119
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no guarantee of a job afterward. Finally, if employers are not in
a position to create an internship whose primary benefit is to
the intern, and the potential for liability is too great, employers
should wisely pass on offering unpaid internships.
VI. CONCLUSION
Internships can provide students with invaluable practical
experience and skills, and provide employers with the
opportunity to give back. When schools and employers
collaborate effectively, they can create successful internships
even under the Portland Terminal factors.
Despite these advantages and the popularity of internships
with students and schools, employers must carefully consider
whether the unpaid internships comply with the Act. If not,
employers face lurking liability under the FLSA for employees
engaged in interstate commerce, specifically minimum wage,
overtime, and record-keeping requirements.
Because the
provisions of the Act cannot be waived, an employer faces
considerable liability (and a potential collective action and
liability for attorney’s fees) from an erroneous interpretation of
the Act.
The majority of federal circuit courts favor a “totality of the
circumstances” test that considers which party receives the
primary benefit from the internship, and hold that the Act is
applicable only if the employer receives the primary benefit.
Further, the majority do not find the fact that the employer
receives an immediate benefit to be dispositive.123
Though we argue Fact Sheet #71 should receive little
deference, the factors identified by Department of Labor are
important if only because they guide the courts’ decisions.
Though the factors are not dispositive; they provide a
framework, for the majority of courts, for analyzing the
primary benefit question.
Even assuming that unpaid internships fall within a safe
harbor with respect to the Act, there are concerns about
exploitation of free labor and uneven access to internship
opportunities. These concerns can be remedied by structuring
an internship to provide a valid educational benefit over a

123
See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–1027
(10th Cir. 1993).
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limited period, and by taking care to broadly publicize the
availability of the opportunity. Further, schools must ensure
that non-discrimination policies are followed both in the
selection process and subsequent supervision by employers.
Internships can provide invaluable practical experience and
skills. By collaborating effectively and being mindful to the
Portland Terminal factors schools and employers can continue
to create and administer successful internships programs.

